Clientelism and Distortion of Anti-Poverty Policies
Program on Poverty and Governance ProjectOngoing
Researchers
Beatriz Magaloni - Stanford University
Alberto Diaz-Cayeros - UCSD
Federico Estévez - ITAM
This area of research assesses how poverty reduction programs in the developing world are often shaped by long-entrenched patterns of patron-client relations in party politics.
As part of this research project we have a book manuscript by Alberto Diaz-Cayeros and Federico Estevez, which analyzes political configurations that are more adept at combating poverty. The analysis comes from a systematic study of the political economy of anti-poverty policies, focusing on the Mexican experience from the late 1980s to the present. One important transformation in Mexico during this period was a reduction in clientelistic practices in social programs, which occurred due to more transparency and decentralization in the administration of these programs and a focus on technical measures to identify beneficiaries according to need. By using a wide range of data and methods to analyze the political logic and effects of a wide range of social transfers, the authors demonstrate that the poor are significantly better off under the new welfare regime than under the previous system.
Contact
Beatriz Magaloni



@StanfordCDDRL
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