The state-based factor was the regime's extreme vulnerability to electoral loss or pressure: an astonishingly diverse set of indicators suggested that the government was going to lose a fair vote and that it had limited capacity or will to fix a vote decisively in its favor. This structural "'vacuum'' of state vulnerability explains much of the success of popular mobilization in Georgia. A more confident government, in particular one capable of brandishing a more credible threat of force, would have been able to deter or withstand the not very large protests.

At the same time, without substantial popular mobilization even a teetering regime might hang on and buttress itself anew. As Georgia's own slow-moving mobilization suggests, it would be a mistake to assume that regime vulnerability automatically engenders popular mobilization. A collective action problem must still be overcome - if not regarding the fear of punishment, then regarding the perceived benefits of participation. To overcome this collective action problem, the actions of a number of social actors, including the government, appear to have been necessary.